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Is the Deadweight Actually Dead? Real Option Value 
and Taxation of Oil and Gas 
Adi Libson 
And both that morning equally lay / In leaves no step had trodden black/ 
Oh, I kept the first for another day! 
-Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, 1916 
ABSTRACT 
Analysis of tax policy overlooks an important element—the real option 
value of the tax.  If a tax causes a company to defer an activity with a high 
probability that the activity will occur in the future when its costs are lower, the 
tax will provide an economic benefit.  Taking into account this real option value 
will have a substantial impact on one of the key issues shaping tax policy—the 
analysis of the deadweight loss caused by a given tax.  This Article will focus on 
the taxation of oil and gas, an area where real option value is especially 
relevant.  The Article shows that the optimal tax rate on oil and gas should be 
higher than under conventional analysis.  The Article also sheds light on how 
this observation about the deadweight loss of taxation is connected to two 
developing strands in legal scholarship: increasing attentiveness to real option 
value, and incorporation of dynamic economic analysis into legal policy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most taxes prevent some economic activity from occurring.  This 
effect is viewed solely as a negative effect of taxation,1 and given an 
appropriate label—”the deadweight loss of taxation.”  In this Article I 
expose how this effect is not necessarily as negative as it would first 
seem.  Preventing an economic activity from taking place may have an 
inconspicuous positive effect: the possibility that the economic activity 
will take place in the future under better conditions.  I will refer to this 
beneficial deferral of economic activity as “real option value.”  A “real 
option” in this context is the company’s ability to control whether to 
engage in an economic activity now or defer that activity to the future.  
The term “real option value” was coined by the economists Avinash 
Dixit and Robert Pindyck, and refers to the value of the ability to wait 
with an irreversible investment decision due to the expectancy that 
better information will be obtained in the future.2 
This observation regarding the value that stems from postponing 
an investment decision has significant legal policy implications.  
Although real option value is relevant to the analysis of tax policy in 
general, it is especially important to the taxation of natural resources, 
and particularly to the taxation of oil and gas extractions.  The constant 
decrease in the extraction costs of these resources as a result of 
technological innovation.  The expectancy of such a future decrease 
in costs endows the real option with significant positive value.  This 
Article will thus focus on the taxation of oil and gas, for which there is 
extensive data showing a constant decrease in costs, but it may equally 
apply to other types of natural resources. 
 
 1  By “taxation” here I mean taxes aimed at revenue raising.  In the case of taxes 
with a regulatory goal, preventing an activity from occurring is not necessarily a 
negative effect of a tax; it might be the tax’s primary objective.  Regarding these two 
distinctive functions of taxation, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 
60 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2006). 
 2  AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 6 
(1994). 
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I will illustrate this point through a numerical example.  Suppose 
that in the state of Resourcia certain indications of oil deposits have 
been discovered.  As a result, the government decides that it is time to 
determine the proper tax rate on revenue from oil fields to ensure that 
the state benefits from these discoveries.  The government is facing a 
choice between two tax regimes: in one there is a 50% tax rate, and in 
the other there is an 80% tax rate.  There are two potential oil fields—
Field A and Field B.  In Field A there is a 90% chance of yielding a net 
value $800 million; exploring, developing, and producing the oil is 
projected to cost $50 million.  In Field B there is a 50% chance of 
yielding a net value of $1 billion, and the investment needed to 
explore, develop, and produce the oil is estimated at $220 million.  All 
of the prospective oil companies are large risk-neutral corporations.  
Under a 50% tax rate regime on profits, the companies will explore 
both fields because both have positive expected net value.  The 
expected net value of Field A under such a tax regime is $355 million: 
(0.9*0.5*800) – (0.1*50) 
And the expected net value of Field B under such a tax regime is 
$140 million: 
(0.5*0.5*1,000) – (0.5*220) 
In contrast, under an 80% tax rate, while Field A will still be 
exploited due to its positive value of $139 million: 
(0.9*0.2*800) – (0.1*50) 
Field B will not be exploited, due to its negative expected value of 
$10 million: 
(0.5*0.2*1,000) – (0.5*220) 
The effect of the 80% tax rate on the non-exploration of Field B is the 
tax’s deadweight loss.  The consequence of such a tax system is that 
society loses out on a beneficial economic activity that would have 
generated an expected net social value of $390 million.  Thus the 
“price” the government is facing for collecting additional expected 
revenue of $366 million under an 80% rate tax (in comparison to a 
50% tax rate)3 is a social cost of $390 million in deadweight loss.  
Resourcia’s government has two options if it is not willing to bear such 
costs in exchange for the additional revenue.  The first option would 
be to opt for an alternative tax mechanism capable of raising the same 
 
 3  Under an 80% tax rate the government’s take increases to $976 million, from 
$610 million under a 50% tax rate.  See infra Table 1.  I assume in this example that 
the companies’ losses, in the event no oil is discovered, are not deductible—i.e. that 
this is the only project the companies are running in the country, or that all other 
projects are losing money and the companies have no profits to deduct from, thus 
there is no loss for the government in case no oil is discovered.  See infra Part VII.B. 
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revenue with less deadweight loss.  The second would be to decide that 
the public goods it intends to provide with the extra $366 million are 
not worth the cost, and thus reduce the amount of public goods 
accordingly.  Table 1 summarizes this example.  All figures are in 
millions of dollars. 
Table 1 
 Net Profits 
from Field 
A 









355 140 610 0 
80% tax 
rate 
571 (10) 976 390 
 
In this Article I will argue that the actual deadweight loss is, 
counterintuitively, lower than in the calculations above.  As a result, it 
is possible that Resourcia should still opt for the 80% tax rate, even if 
there is an alternative tax mechanism that can raise the additional 
revenue with a deadweight loss lower than $366 million. 
Current analysis of the effect of taxation on gas and oil production 
overestimates the deadweight loss of taxation.  As a result, it prescribes 
suboptimal tax rates on gas and oil production.  Specifically, 
conventional analysis does not fully take into account the strong 
possibility of a reduction in the costs of exploration, development, and 
production of oil and gas that stems from technological progress.  Such 
technological advances, however, have a significant impact on the 
deadweight loss of taxation for oil and gas.  Even if in the short run a 
given tax rate might prevent additional explorations, discoveries, and 
production, in the medium run there is a high likelihood that the 
exploration and production will still take place.  The expected 
reduction in exploration and production costs due to technological 
innovation will turn such explorations into profitable activities even 
under the higher tax rate.  The value that such an expectation 
generates—the opportunity to explore, develop, and produce gas and 
oil in the future, when the activity will probably be more valuable even 
if it is not profitable in the present—is what I label “real option value.” 
In the example above, taking into account a 20% probability that 
the costs will decrease by 60% in the future changes the picture.  Even 
if in the short run—t1—Field B will not be developed, there is a 20% 
chance that it would be developed in the medium run—t2.  Under such 
a scenario there will still be deadweight loss from postposing the 
production due to the time value of resources: possessing the resources 
LIBSON(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:26 PM 
2015] IS THE DEADWEIGHT ACTUALLY DEAD? 837 
later in t2 is worth less than having them now in t1.  There will, however, 
also be a surplus from waiting to develop due to the reduction in costs.4  
The actual social value of such a scenario depends on the relationship 
between the discount rate of the future value of the resources and the 
rate of the reduction in cost.  Let us assume that, due to the time value 
of resources, the present value of the resources extracted in t2 would 
be 10% lower than in t1, but that the costs would decrease by 60%.  
Under such a scenario, the value of exploration of Field A in t2 would 
be $69.2 million, and it would be explored: 
0.2*0.5*(1000+0.6*220) – 0.5*0.4*220 
The term on the left side is the expected benefit from the 
exploration: a 50% probability that the $1.132 billion net value of 
resources would be discovered in t2, multiplied by the after-tax profits 
(0.2).  The net value has increased from $1 billion because of the 60% 
decrease in costs.  The term on the right is the expected cost, which 
would constitute only 40% of the costs of exploration in t1.  The overall 
deadweight loss of the 80% tax would decrease to $297 million when 
taking into account the real option value of production in t2: 
0.8*390 – 0.2*(132-50)*10/11 
The term on the left is the expected deadweight loss if the 
technological innovation does not take place.  The term on the right 
is the expected surplus if the technological innovation does take place.  
The reason for the minus sign is that if the technological innovation 
does take place, postponing production to t2 generates a surplus and 
thus reduces the deadweight.  While postponing production decreases 
costs by $132 million (0.6*220), it decreases by $50 million the 
expected value due to the time value of resources (500*0.1).  In order 
to convert this net surplus from postponing production and reducing 
future costs to present value terms, the expression is multiplied by 10/
11. 
The decrease in the deadweight loss by $97 million might turn the 
80% tax rate to an attractive tax regime.  Let us assume that the 
deadweight loss of the alternative tax mechanism for raising the same 
revenue is $320 million.  Under the traditional analysis of deadweight 
loss, an 80% tax would seem inefficient: it would have generated a 
higher deadweight loss for the same revenue.  In contrast, under the 
analysis that took into account the real option value of not developing 
the tract in t1, the 80% tax seems efficient: the assessed deadweight loss 
 
 4  This possibility is not essential for the argument of the Article; it is sufficient 
that real option value will reduce the deadweight loss.  It does not require that 
production in the future will be of higher value than production in the present.  For 
a discussion regarding the likelihood of such a possibility, see infra Part IV. 
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is lower than that of an alternative tax mechanism.  This would be true 
for any alternative tax mechanism with a deadweight loss between $297 
and $390 million.  While under the traditional analysis an 80% tax rate 
on gas and oil would be inefficient compared to such alternatives, 
under the analysis that takes into account the real option value 
generated by the tax, such rates would seem efficient. 
The real option value that a tax generates stems from adding a 
dynamic element into the economic analysis of the effect of a tax, in 
contrast to the static economic analysis that underlies the conventional 
account of deadweight loss.  The dynamic analysis is more sensitive to 
how the exogenous economic circumstances evolve over time, and 
reveals that the deadweight loss of the tax is coupled with a possible 
benefit—the possibility that the economic activity that the tax prevents 
in the present will take place in future.  In a world without the tax, the 
economic activity would have taken place in the present and thus the 
option of producing the oil at lower cost would not exist. 
Part I of this Article lays out the legal framework for taxation of 
oil and gas, and the processes and considerations of government 
agencies that determine the appropriate tax rate.  Part II presents the 
general concept of real option value and its relevance to oil and gas 
taxation.  Part III of this Article demonstrates how real option value fits 
into the basic economic model by which the optimal tax rate on oil 
and gas should be determined.  Part IV substantiates the claim that 
there is a strong probability of a future decrease in the cost of 
exploration and production in the oil and gas sectors.  Part V attempts 
to provide an account for why real option value has been overlooked.  
Part VI discusses several potential problems with my argument: the 
possibility of realizing the real option value of exploration in the 
present, the possibility of setting up an oil and gas tax regime with no 
deadweight loss, and the possibility of the forecasts for future decreases 
in costs being erroneous.  I conclude the Article by arguing that even 
though there are significant caveats in the analysis presented in this 
paper, taking the dynamic element of real option value into account is 
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II.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE OF GAS AND OIL TAXATION 
In the United States, taxes on oil and gas extraction activity consist 
of the standard corporate tax5 in addition to royalties, rents, and 
“bonus bids”—the lump sum payment companies make in an auction 
for leasing a particular tract.6  The royalty rate differs between offshore 
tracts and onshore tracts.  Offshore extractions are taxed at a rate of 
18.75%, while onshore extractions are taxed at a rate of 12.5%.  The 
reason for this difference is not economic, but legal.  The statute 
providing the Secretary of Interior with authority to set the royalty rate 
on offshore leases is the Outer Continental Shelf Act,7 which provides 
the Secretary flexibility in setting the rate.  In contrast, the rate for 
onshore extractions is controlled by the Mineral Leasing Act, which 
requires that the rate be set by Department of the Interior regulations.8  
Revising regulations is a much more complex task, and thus the 
Secretary of Interior has less flexibility in determining the rate for 
onshore extractions.9 
The revenue the government collected from these direct 
payments for development of resources reached $9.7 billion in 2012.  
The lion’s share of this revenue—87%—stemmed from royalties ($8.5 
billion).  Bonus bids are the source of 10% of this sum ($946 million) 
and rental fees are the source of 3% of this sum ($273 million).10  While 
this overall sum seems like a significant source of revenue, it is only a 
small portion of the revenue companies have received from the sale of 
 
 5  Unlike most other OECD countries, there is no special tax rate in the United 
States for profits from natural resources.  Such profits are taxed at the same rate as 
other sources of income: up to 35% of corporate profits and 39.6% of profits of 
individuals and pass-through entities.  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 11(b)(d), 1(a)(2) (2014).  The 
effective tax rate is even lower than the standard tax rate on revenues.  The tax code 
provides generous rules for expensing and deducting expenses incurred in the 
production of natural resources, such as the percentage depletion allowance that 
enables gas and oil producers to deduct 15% of their gross income.  As a result the 
cumulative depletion could exceed the amount of capital the taxpayer spent on 
acquiring the property.  See 26 U.S.C. § 613 (2014). 
 6  43 C.F.R. § 3120.1-1 (1988). 
 7  43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2014).   
 8  30 U.S.C. § 181 (2014). 
 9  The Secretary of the Interior is in the process of increasing the royalty rate for 
onshore extractions.  In response to a report of the Government Accountability Office, 
which recommended increasing the royalty rate for onshore extractions, the 
Department of the Interior claimed that such a change in regulation would take a long 
period of time due to the requirement of going through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, which takes one to two years.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-14-50, OIL AND GAS RESOURCES: ACTION NEEDED FOR INTERIOR TO BETTER ENSURE 
A FAIR RETURN 17–18 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 660/659515.pdf.  
 10  Reported Revenues by Category for FY2012, OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE, 
available at http://statistics.onrr.gov/ReportTool.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
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oil and gas produced from federal land and waters, which was $66 
billion.11  The amount of revenue raised, and the proportions provided 
by the different sources of income, have remained more or less 
constant since 2005 with the exception of FY 2008.  Due to a staggering 
increase in energy prices the revenue doubled in 2008, and the 
amount raised from bonus bids jumped from the multi-year average of 
10% of the total revenue to over 50% of the total revenue ($9 billion).12 
The Government Accountability Office has already criticized the 
suboptimal taxation of gas and oil extractions.  In its 2007 report it 
pointed out that the overall government take—the aggregation of all 
forms of taxes and royalties that apply to gas and oil producers—from 
federal waters such as the Gulf of Mexico is approximately 41–45%.13  
This rate of government take is one of the lowest in the world,14 much 
lower than Norway with a government take of 76%,15 and even lower 
than the United Kingdom with a government take of 52%.16  Since the 
report the government take has increased, due to an increase in 
royalties on offshore extractions by 6.25% (from 12.5% to 18.75%).  
But according to recent OECD data the U.S. government take from 
deep-water oil extractions is only 51%, still far below Norway which has 
remained around the same level—75% and even the United Kingdom 
with a 51.5% government take.  The government take on extractions 
 
 11  Supra note 9, at 1. 
 12  Irena Agalliu, Comparative Assessment of the Federal Oil and Gas Fiscal System, 
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT. 8 (2011), available at http://www.energy.senate.gov 
/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=d174971c-4682-4d96-b194-a85fa2b86774. 
 13  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OIL AND GAS ROYALTIES: A COMPARISON OF 
THE SHARE OF REVENUE RECEIVED FROM OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION BY THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT AND OTHER RESOURCE OWNERS 4–5 (2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/94953.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].  In most states 
there is an additional severance tax that applies to the net value of production and 
ranges from 3% (Utah) to 15% (Alaska).  For survey of tax rates in different states, see 
Ujjayant Chakravorty, Shelby Gerking & Andrew Leach, State Tax Policy and Oil 
Production: The Role of the Severance Tax and Credits for Drilling, in U.S. ENERGY TAX POLICY 
305–37 (Gilbert E. Metcalf ed., 2009), available at http://www.americantax 
policyinstitute.org/pdf/energy_conference/chakravorty-gerking-leach.pdf. 
 14  GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 4–5. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id.  It should be noted that although the GAO report is based on the summary 
of four studies, which all have approximately the same numbers, Daniel Johnston 
claims that in the case of the U.S. the government take is actually much higher, around 
70%.  According to Johnston, these studies do not take into account the price the U.S. 
charges for leasing land, which is one of the highest in the world per-acre, and the 
“bonus bid” mechanism through which the U.S. captures a substantial portion of the 
rent of the production of natural resources and raises $65 billion in revenue.  See 
Daniel Johnston, Changing Fiscal Landscape, 1 J. WORLD ENERGY & BUS. 31, 49–50 
(2008). 
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from the shelf is higher, at around 57%.17  Given the economic 
attractiveness of the American fields, due to their proximity to the 
American market and the relatively low expenses for the mobilization 
of the extracted resources, the U.S. government take still seems far too 
low.18 
The discussion between the different agencies on the optimal 
royalty rate is especially interesting, because it reveals the on-the-
ground reasoning behind the rate.  It stands in contrast to political 
decisions regarding the income or corporate tax rate.  Because these 
decisions are made by Congress and not by executive agencies, the 
outcome is primarily a factor of political economy considerations, and 
is not expected to mirror optimal tax policy.  In the case of royalties in 
which an executive agency is in charge of deciding the rate, optimal 
tax policy considerations dominate the process, along with other 
“pure” policy considerations such as environmental and distributive 
effects.  While legal scholarship demonstrates how even governmental 
agencies could be captured by private interests,19 governmental 
agencies are relatively more insulated than the legislature from such 
 
 17  OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: NEW ZEALAND 2013, AVERAGE GOVERNMENT TAKE IN 
OIL AND GAS FISCAL REGIMES 31 (2013), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-
Asset-Management/oecd/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-new-zealand-2013/ 
average-government-take-in-oil-and-gas-fiscal-regimes_eco_surveys-nzl-2013-graph21-
en#page1 (last visited Jan. 21, 2014).  This increase seems to be part of a general trend 
in those years in which many other countries also increased the government take after 
energy prices peaked in 2008.  The trend has reversed in many of the countries after 
the deep decline in energy prices after 2008.  See Agalliu, supra note 12. 
 18  GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 7. 
 19  For a description of the ascendance of “capture theory,” and the transition from 
the belief that executive agencies are the “transmission belt for implementing 
legislative directive” to the belief that agencies are dominated by the regulated 
industries, see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1675 (1975).  For an overview of more modern versions of “capture 
theories,” see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285 (2006) (describing a shift in the 
conceptualization of capture, from a focus on the pressure of regulated industries on 
committee members overlooking the agency to cooperation with the agency in 
providing it with information and guidance).  The growing awareness of agencies’ 
inclination to be “captured” by interests of regulated industries brought legal scholars 
to focus on the means by which agencies could be protected from capture, especially 
their independence from the political sphere.  See Paul Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits 
of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 259–60 (1988); Marshal Berger & Gary J. 
Edles, Establishing the Practice; The Theory and Operation of Independent agencies, 52 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2000); Daryl Levinson & Richard Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2376–77 (2006); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So 
Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 459 (2008); Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010). 
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interests.20 
When observing the considerations both the Department of the 
Interior and the Government Accountability Office are taking into 
account, one finds that they primarily focus on the revenue forgone 
due to the decrease in the amount of leases as a result of an increase 
in the royalty rate.  They balance this loss against the increase in 
revenue from the remaining leases.  The decrease in the amount of 
leases is what is labeled in economic jargon as the tax’s “deadweight 
loss.” 
These considerations are reflected both in the reports of these 
governmental agencies and their internal discussions.  The 
Governmental Accountability Office report mainly focuses on the 
comparison of the U.S. government take from oil and gas extractions 
to those of other countries.  The report makes reference to the 
considerations that the DOI’s representatives have raised in 
determining the royalty rate, which centered on balancing between 
increasing revenue on the one hand and decreasing output on the 
other.  The decrease in output is referred to as a “net-cost” of raising 
the royalty rate: 
Interior’s analysis included estimates for increasing royalty 
rates beyond 18.75 percent.  Specifically, it estimated that 
royalty rate increases from 18.75 to 21.875 percent would 
cause production losses of 2 to 6 percent with royalty revenue 
increases of 11 to 17 percent.  According to the analysis, the 
effect of increased royalty rates, depending on the size of the 
change, would be less production, but with the potential for 
higher revenues from royalties in the future.  Interior found 
that a large increase in the royalty rate could curtail expected 
returns to lessees to such a large extent that it might unduly 
reduce leasing and future production by proportions greater 
than suggested in its analysis.  Much higher royalty rates 
could also curtail production from new leases in the future 
as production declines in the later phases of a lease’s 
productive life.21 
The decrease in output as a result of the increase in the royalty rate is 
referred to as a “loss.”  There is no discussion regarding the possible 
 
 20  See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 55–63 (1982) (claiming that delegation from legislators to professional bureaucratic 
officials stems from strategic efforts to “duck” decisions that would displease interests 
groups); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political 
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91–95 (1985) (arguing that delegating political 
decisions to the expertise of bureaucrats enables the legislature to get “more policy 
bang for its legislative buck”). 
 21  Supra note 9, at n.26.   
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economic upsides of a decrease in output. 
A similar cost-benefit analysis by the Department of the Interior is 
also reflected in its analysis of an increase in the rental rates of tracts.  
The DOI juxtaposes the increase in revenue with an approximation of 
the number of tracts that would not be leased as a result of such an 
increase (5 tracts), which is treated as a net loss.22  There is no mention 
of the possible upside of postponing production that might curtail the 
costs. 
This approach is not limited to the brief description of the cost-
benefit analysis of the DOI in the GAO report.  It is also reflected in 
third party studies that the DOI has invited and on which its policy is 
based.  The DOI’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management has invited a 
study from Economic Analysis, Inc. and the Marine Policy Center, 
entitled “Policies to Affect the Pace of Leasing and Revenues in the 
Gulf of Mexico.”  This report has also not addressed the possible 
upsides of decreasing the pace of leasing, aside from the 
environmental advantages.  It too has assumed that a decrease in 
leasing will reduce revenues, without factoring in the possible impact 
of technological progress on the cost of future extractions.23 
My argument in this Article is that there is an additional factor 
which is not taken at all into account in determining the optimal tax 
rate or royalty rate on oil and gas extractions.  This is the real option 
value of extracting the resources in a later period.  The main reason 
that such an option has positive value is due to the strong likelihood 
that the costs of extracting the resources will decrease significantly due 
to technological progress.  As I have demonstrated above, none of the 
governmental agencies determining the royalty rate have taken this 
factor into account in any way.  In the next section, I will delineate what 
the real option value is and how it relates to the economic analysis of 
oil and gas taxation. 
III.  REAL OPTION VALUE AND OIL AND GAS TAXATION 
The real option value in the natural resources sector is of 
significant economic magnitude.  In recent years many countries, 
especially the United States, have discovered significant amounts of 
 
 22  Id. at 15. 
 23  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, INC. & MARINE POLICY CENTER, FINAL REPORT: POLICIES TO 
AFFECT THE PACE OF LEASING AND REVENUES IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, OCS STUDY 
BOEMRE 2011-013, at 26 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.boem.gov/BOEM-
Newsroom/Library/Publications/2011/2011-013-Part1.aspx. 
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natural resource reserves, especially shale gas24 and shale oil.25  On the 
one hand, the deficits in the national budgets of many of these 
countries, in addition to the high energy prices in 2006–2008, 
intensified their motivation to tax the extraction of these resources to 
their highest ability.26  On the other hand, due to the increasing 
likelihood that additional reserves might be discovered, these 
countries wanted to avoid the deadweight effect of a tax on natural 
resources: tax rates that might deter companies from further 
exploration and production.27 
Recent legal scholarship has raised awareness of option and real 
option value.  In many fields it has been claimed that the existence of 
option value is overlooked and not taken into account by policymakers, 
legislators, and legal scholars.  Ian Ayres has discussed option value in 
the context of legal entitlements in general.28  Joseph Grundfest and 
Peter Huang use option value in the field of litigation behavior to 
provide an account of why certain lawsuits aren’t settled as early as the 
conventional model prescribes.29  In the field of bankruptcy, Douglas 
Baird and Edward Morrison claim that the option value that 
 
 24  For projections of the future increase in production of shale gas, see infra notes 
81–83 and accompanying text. 
 25  See Leonardo Maugeri, The Shale Oil Boom: A U.S. Phenomenon 1–10, 18–24, (The 
Geopolitics of Energy Project—Harvard Kennedy Sch. Belfer Ctr., Discussion Paper 
#2013-05, 2013), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ 
USShaleOilReport.pdf.  Maugeri notes that in 2012 out of 6.44 mbd of crude oil, 1.14 
(17.7%) is tight and shale crude oil.  It is projected that by 2017 the tight and shale 
crude oil will reach almost 50% of all crude oil produced—5 mbd, out of an increased 
total of 10.4.  See id. at 19.  The reason why the technology of shale extraction had a 
much greater impact in the United States than in other countries is primarily due to 
the fact that shale extraction is highly drilling intensive, and 60% of rigs are located in 
the U.S.  In addition, in the U.S. most shale fields are not located in densely populated 
areas.  See id. at 1–2. 
 26  The United States has increased the royalties rate in the Gulf of Mexico in both 
deepwater and the shelf (see supra Part II) and increased rental rates in 2009 from 
$7.50 per acre to $11–$44 in deepwater, and from $5 to $7–$28 in the shelf, see Agalliu, 
supra note 12 at 280.  China introduced both a 74% windfall profit tax for when crude 
oil prices exceed $40 per barrel, and a 5% export duty.  Id. at 274.  In 2007, India 
increased the rate of the Minimum Alternate Tax from 7.5% of book profits to 10%.  
Id.  In 2006, the United Kingdom increased the rate of the special petroleum tax from 
10% to 20%, and in 2011 it raised the rate to 32%.  Id. at. 279–80. 
 27  Canada (Alberta) is a classic example of such a dynamic.  In 2007 the 
government increased royalties from 30% to 50%.  Id. at 272.  After a decline in drilling 
activity it suspended the 2007 royalty framework and instated a lower royalty rate—up 
to 40% on oil and 36% on gas.  Id. 
 28  See generally IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 
(2005). 
 29  Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real 
Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1275 (2006).   
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accompanies chapter 11 bankruptcies incentivizes parties to withhold 
information and thus makes chapter 11 less efficient than a mandatory 
auction.30  Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner use option value to shed light 
on the undervaluation of the timing of legislation and regulation in 
the fields of administrative law and legislation.31  Lee-Anne Fennel 
suggests using self-made options to mitigate the problem of unknown 
subjective valuation in the context of liability and property rights.32  
Lynne Hold, Paul Sotkiewicz, and Sanford Berg utilize an option value 
model to assess the uncertainty that a nuclear plant developer faces in 
the field of risk regulation.33 
The most relevant application of real option value to legal policy 
to the one discussed in this Article is Michael Livermore’s study of real 
option value in the context of the regulation of natural resources.34  
Similarly to the point raised above, Livermore refers to the real option 
value that accompanies non-exploration.  Livermore concentrates on 
the application of this point to the regulation of the allocation of lease 
rights for exploration of natural resources through auctions.35  His 
main argument is that the government does not internalize the option 
value that accompanies non-exploration, and as a consequence sets the 
lease price for exploring fields too low.36  While Livermore does touch 
on the real option value that stems from uncertainty regarding 
extraction costs, he primarily focuses on the environmental social cost 
as a source of real option value.37  Furthermore, Livermore emphasizes 
the real option value of reducing uncertainty by waiting.  In this 
Article, I do not claim that waiting generates real option value per se; 
real option value exists when there is a positive expectation of an 
increase in value, otherwise waiting might generate negative real option 
 
 30  Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 356, 358–66 (2001). 
 31  Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 543, 544 (2007). 
 32  See Lee-Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1402–07 
(2005). 
 33  See Lynne Holt, Paul Sotkiewicz & Sanford Berg, (When) to Build or Not to Build?: 
The Role of Uncertainty in Nuclear Power Expansion, 3 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 174 
(2008). 
 34 See Michael A. Livermore, Patience is an Economic Virtue: Real Options, Natural 
Resources and Offshore Oil, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 581 (2013). 
 35  Id. at 585. 
 36  Id. at 585–86. 
 37  Id. at 605–13.  Livermore touches technological development only briefly, as 
one dimension among three that account for the uncertainty of deep-water ocean 
drilling.  The other dimension besides environmental and social costs is the price 
dimension of the natural resource. 
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value.38  In this Article, I explore the relevance of overlooking the real 
option value of non-exploration to the analysis of taxation in general, 
and to the royalty rate of oil and gas exploration in particular.  In 
addition, I will elaborate in Part III39 on the main source of the positive 
option value that accompanies the non-exploitation of a field: the high 
probability of future technological progress that will reduce the costs 
of exploration, development, and production of oil and gas. 
An additional study examining the application of real option 
value to the legal context is Jeff Strnad’s study, which examines the 
relevance of real option value to the context of natural resource 
exploration and production and its impact on tax policy.40  Strnad’s 
primary concern is finding the optimal tax mix within the natural 
resources sector and reducing the distortionary effect of taxation on 
the decision which projects are pursued in the natural resources 
sector.41  However, Strnad overlooks the most significant effect of real 
option value on the taxation of natural resources—its impact on the 
overall deadweight loss of taxation, and as a consequence on the 
optimal tax rate on natural resources.  My goal in this Article is to 
explore this significant feature of option value.  In contrast to Strnad, 
this Article does not go into internal questions of taxation on natural 
resources such as the appropriate mechanism through which natural 
resources should be taxed: royalties or taxation of the economic rent 
through a tax on profits.  Rather, it is concerned only with the overall 
government take (GT) from revenues stemming from natural 
resources, and not with the elements that comprise the GT.42  Strnad is 
concerned with the “internal deadweight” effect resulting from the 
structure of taxes on natural resources—their distortionary effect 
 
 38  I will demonstrate my critique that waiting does not per se generate real option 
value by focusing on Livermore’s third dimension of uncertainty: price uncertainty.  
Passing time doesn’t resolve the uncertainty concerning the price.  We may have 
information regarding the price in the period to which we postponed exploration, but 
we have added uncertainty concerning the price in the additional unit of time that has 
become relevant due to the postponement of the exploration (e.g., if we have 
postponed production from 1990 to 1991, and the price that is economically relevant 
is the price in the subsequent 20 years after the time of exploration, we may have 
information regarding the price in 1991 that we wouldn’t have if we didn’t postpone 
production, but we have added uncertainty regarding the price in 2021 that would 
have been irrelevant if we had not postponed production). 
 39  See infra Part V.  
 40  Jeff Strnad, Taxes and Nonrenewable Resources: The Impact on Exploration and 
Development, 55 SMU L. REV. 1683 (2002).   
 41  See id. at 1686–91. 
 42  See Johnston, supra note 16, at 38–39 (discussing a comparative study of 
government take from oil profits in different countries). 
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within the natural resources sector.43  In contrast, the concern in this 
Article is with the “external deadweight” effect of taxes—the 
distortionary effect of taxes on the levels of economic activity in the 
market as a whole; the mix between the taxation on natural resources 
and other sources of revenue.  This, of course, depends on the analysis 
of the deadweight loss of taxes on natural resources in comparison to 
the deadweight loss of other forms of taxation. 
This Article will also shed light on how the neglect of real option 
value is connected to a more general problem in legal scholarship: it 
is too focused on static economic analysis and overlooks significant 
implications that stem from dynamic elements.44 
Deadweight loss is one of the central considerations in designing 
an efficient tax mechanism, and analysis of deadweight loss has 
generated many implications for tax law.  In their argument for a 
consumption tax, Bankman and Weisbach have emphasized the 
importance of levying taxes on goods with low elasticity rather than 
goods with high elasticity.  The effect of taxes on behavior is weaker 
for low elasticity goods, and as a result the deadweight loss is more 
limited.45  Terrence R. Chovart has justified imposing a second tax on 
corporate income by arguing that it triggers a weak response and, thus, 
has a minimal deadweight effect.46  Daniel Shaviro has argued that 
rules identifying the realization of income should bend toward 
realization in cases of inelastic transactions to minimize deadweight 
loss.47  In the same vein, Deborah Schenck has illuminated the effect 
of realization rules on marginal income elasticity, and how realization 
rules that decrease income elasticity reduce the deadweight loss of 
taxes.48  David Schizer has claimed that to minimize deadweight loss, 
the tax system should discriminate between actors with inelastic 
preferences and actors with elastic preferences.49  In this Article, I 
address the computation of the deadweight loss of a tax, and expose 
how the conventional analysis of deadweight loss misses a significant 
 
 43  See Strnad, supra note 40.  Strnad’s main concern is with whether a given tax 
meddles with the pre-tax ranking of projects to be pursued. 
 44  See infra Part 0 
 45  See Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption 
Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1420 n.10 (2006). 
 46  Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 239, 255 (2003). 
 47  Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under 
the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 4 (1992). 
 48  Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency Approach to Reforming A Realization-Based Tax, 
57 TAX L. REV. 503, 504–07 (2004). 
 49  David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax 
Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1353 n.47 (2000).   
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element that may decrease the estimated overall deadweight loss.  One 
of the main implications of this analysis is that the tax rate on natural 
resources should be higher than it normally is under the conventional 
analysis and, thus, that taxes on natural resources should be a more 
significant element in the general tax mix. 
Needless to say, tax policy is guided not just by efficiency 
considerations, but also by political and fairness considerations.50  
While in many cases concerns over efficiency considerations run 
counter to these other considerations, perhaps fairness in particular,51 
the efficiency consideration of taking real option value into account 
actually furthers fairness considerations.  One of the most common 
fairness claims is that states should increase tax rates on natural 
resources because resources belong to the public at large and, thus, 
the public should be the primary beneficiary of any revenue generated.  
The state’s claim to its resources is based on its “birthright to the 
natural heritage of the state.”52  Taking real option value into account 
thus furthers the goal of fairness by increasing the tax rate on revenues 
generated from the production of natural resources. 
IV.  FITTING REAL OPTION VALUE INTO THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 
In general, optimal taxation is defined by the tax allocation that 
minimizes the deadweight loss of taxation, given the amount of 
revenue that the government is interested in collecting and its 
distributive choices.53  The deadweight loss of a tax is a computation of 
a tax’s social cost due to its distortionary effect on taxpayers, who alter 
their behavior in response to the tax and so eliminate mutually 
beneficial transactions that would occur in a tax-free world.54  The 
deadweight loss thus equals the total surplus the two sides would have 
incurred from the transactions that did not take place due to the tax 
imposed. 
 
 50  LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 3–4 (2002). 
 51  See, e.g., Barbara Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. 
REV. 157, 168 (arguing that scholars supporting proportionate taxation on fairness 
grounds pay a price in terms of efficiency because proportionate taxes are not an 
optimal pricing solution for public goods). 
 52  See Walter Hellerstein, Political Perspectives on the State and Local Taxation of 
Natural Resources, 19 GA. L. REV. 31, 34 (1984). 
 53  See Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation: An Introduction to the Literature, 6 J. PUB. 
ECON. 37 (1976). 
 54  See Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 61, 67 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
1985). 
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The existence of deadweight loss in and of itself does not mean 
that the tax is inefficient.  Almost all taxes cause some deadweight loss.  
The tax is inefficient only if the same amount of revenue could have 
been raised through an alternative tax mechanism with a lower 
deadweight loss effect.55  Thus, in order to fully determine whether a 
certain tax is optimal, one has to know the deadweight loss of an 
alternative tax that would raise the same revenue.  The first step for 
determining the optimal tax rate is assessing the deadweight loss it 
creates in absolute terms. 
In order to estimate deadweight loss of a tax in the case of natural 
resources, one must estimate the effect of the tax on the value of the 
expected profile of extractions.  This is one of the uses of the Hotelling 
Rule.  According to the Hotelling Rule, framed by Professor Harold 
Hotelling, the optimal extraction of a resource will be determined 
such that the market return on the resource will equal the market 
return on an alternative investment.56  If the expected return on the 
extraction of a marginal resource unit is below the market rate of 
return on alternative investments, the owner of the resource will prefer 
to invest the cost of extracting that unit in alternative investments 
where the return will be higher. 
For example, assume the cost of extracting a given unit of a 
natural resource is $5, and the unit could be sold for $5.20 one year 
after making the initial investment.  Assume the individual could buy 
a bond that would pay him a 5% interest with the same level of risk as 
in the extraction activity.  Under such circumstances, the individual 
will not extract the extra unit—she will prefer to invest her money in 
the bond rather than investing it in extracting the marginal resource 
unit.  While her returns for investing the $5 on the extraction of 
resources will be $0.20, her returns on investing in the bond will be 
greater: $0.25.  For the previous resource units it may have been 
profitable for the individual to invest in extraction, since the cost 
function is increasing to scale and their extraction costs were lower 
and, thus, provided a higher return for the investment than for the 
bond.  She will, however, extract that additional marginal resource unit 





 55  See Sandmo, supra note 53. 
 56  See generally H. Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 
137 (1931). 
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Given that natural resource stocks are much greater than the 
amount of natural resources extracted in equilibrium,57 the Hotelling 
Rule predicts that the price of natural resources will increase at the 
same rate as the standard market rate of returns on alternative 
investments.  Given a certain stock of resources, the deadweight loss of 
taxes on natural investments could be calculated by solving the 
following equation:58 
ܦ ௦ܹ ൌ ݉ܽݔ௤௧ ቄܤሺݍ௧ሻ െ ܥሺݍ௧, ௧ܵሻ ൅ ଵଵା௥ ܧ௧ሾܸሺ ௧ܵାଵሻሿቅ െ 	݉ܽݔ௤௧ ቄܤሺݍ௧ሻ െ ܥ௧௔௫ሺݍ௧, ௧ܵሻ ൅
ଵ
ଵା௥ ܧ௧ሾܸሺ ௧ܵାଵሻሿቅ - Tpv 
DWs stands for the deadweight loss in the value of a given stock from 
the imposition of a tax.  B(qt) denotes the benefit from the extraction 
of quantity q of the resource in period t.  C(qt, St) is the cost of 
extracting quantity q in period t, out of the given stock S.  Ctax(qt,st) is 
the cost of extracting quantity q in period t including the tax, r is the 
discount rate based on the market’s rate of return on riskless 
investments, and Et is the expectation of the value (denoted by V) of 
the stocks remaining in period t+1.59  Tpv is the present value of the tax 
payments that would be paid on the production of resources from the 
stockpile. 
According to this equation, the deadweight loss of a tax on a 
natural resource equals the difference between the pre-tax present 
value of the profile of extractions and the post-tax present value of the 
profile of extractions minus the taxes collected. 
The problem is that the estimation of the overall deadweight loss 
caused by a tax on natural resources does not end here.  There is an 
additional element that complicates the calculation of the deadweight 
loss in the case of natural resources.  The deadweight loss is not 
 
 57  This is due to the discovery of new deposits.  See Jeffrey A. Krautkraemer, 
Nonrenewable Resource Scarcity, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 2065, 2102 (1998). 
 58  This equation is based on one of the applications of the Hotelling Rule, noted 
by Boadway & Keen.  They derived from the Hotelling Rule the present value 
attributed to a given resource stock, which is the expression in the parenthesis both 
on the right and on the left of the minus symbol in the middle of the equation.  From 
this equation it is very simple to derive the tax’s deadweight loss regarding a given 
resource.  It is the present value of the extraction path in a tax-free world, minus the 
present value of the extraction path given a tax, minus the present value of the taxes 
collected by the government from the revenues of the resource.  See R. Boadway & M. 
Keen, Theoretical Perspectives on Resource Tax Design, in THE TAXATION OF PETROLEUM AND 
MINERALS PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND PRACTICE 26 (Philip Daniel & Michael Keen eds., 
2010). 
 59  This equation is recursive—value of the stock in time t could be determined 
only after determining the value of the stock in time t+1. 
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comprised only of the effect of altering the optimal extraction profile 
of a given stock referred to above.  In addition, the tax on natural 
resources will diminish the amount of new stocks discovered by 
exploration, further increasing the deadweight of the tax.  As 
explained above, the tax lowers the net profits a firm will receive from 
discovering a new stockpile of natural resources, and as a result there 
will be a lower incentive to execute explorations.  This is because the 
lower expected returns may not compensate the firm for the risk 
involved in the explorations.  The Hotelling rule was devised to 
estimate the optimal extraction path of a given resource.  But the 
deadweight loss of taxes on natural resources is not comprised only of 
the distortion of the extraction path of a given stockpile.  A central 
element of the deadweight loss is the effect of the tax on whether new 
stockpiles of natural resources are discovered.  As stated above, such 
an effect will occur even if there is no tax on the exploration phase.  
Even if the firm is taxed on its rents from production, ex ante it will see 
a lower level of post-tax net profits.  The lower level of net profits will 
lower its incentive to explore new areas for resources.  Surprisingly, 
there is no formal economic model for estimating the deadweight loss 
caused by taxation on the discovery of additional stockpiles of natural 
resources. 
The absence of a formal model that takes into account the 
complexities of the relationship between taxation and discovery of 
additional stockpiles may seriously distort any attempt to assess the 
deadweight effect of taxes on natural resources.  One of the central 
problems with assessing the deadweight loss of taxes due to eliminating 
the discovery of additional stockpiles is that one can never be certain 
regarding the quantity of stockpiles that haven’t been discovered.  
After all, we simply cannot know whether they exist. Although we have 
no perfect knowledge of the existence of such stockpiles, we do have 
partial information regarding the expectation that certain stockpiles 
may be found in certain areas. 
If taxation at a certain rate would prevent us from discovering 
additional stockpiles, the deadweight loss should not equal the full 
value of the stockpile—the discovery has only increased the subjective 
likelihood that the stockpile exists.  The high likelihood of finding a 
stockpile does not disappear if a certain tax regime makes it 
unprofitable to explore whether the stockpile actually exists.  Similarly, 
the value of the expectation of finding a stockpile in a certain location 
does not disappear even if an exploration to find the stockpile is not 
pursued.  The value of such a stockpile is essentially an option to invest 
X dollars for a probability P to find the value of Y in natural resources.  
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In other words, the value of the option to explore in the future whether 
there is a stockpile of natural resources in a certain site (denoted by 
On) could be described by the following equation: 
On=P*Y-X 
It is true that this option is worthless if at the expiration date 
X>P*Y.  But it is not correct to deduce that if in the present X>P*Y, it 
will always be true that X>P*Y.  Even if a tax rate may lower the post-
tax value of Y, so that the value of P*Y is lower than the costs of 
exploration, in a dynamic setting where the parameters fluctuate these 
option may have positive value if P or Y increase or if X decreases.60 
If there is no real reason to believe that any of these parameters 
will change, the value of On will not be substantial and will be close to 
0—the future value will not deviate substantially from the present value 
of 0.  This Article will argue that there are firm grounds to believe that 
in the future the cost of X will substantially decrease.  As a result, even 
if in the present X>P*Y and, thus, no exploration will take place in 
such a field, the option On is still valuable due to the strong likelihood 
that in the future X will decrease.  While there are strong grounds to 
assume that P and Y will not change—both the probability of finding a 
stockpile and the price and value of a resource incorporate 
information of future changes—X might change substantially.  The 
expectancy of the change in X is based on the expectancy of 
technological innovations in the future that would reduce the costs of 
exploration and production.  Thus when estimating the deadweight 
loss of taxes on natural resources, the loss from the non-exploration of 
the field should be reduced by the benefit of the option to explore the 
field in the future.61 
 
 
 60  Volatility is a significant factor in determining the value of the option according 
to the Black & Scholes formula for option valuation.  See SHELDON NATENBERG, OPTION 
VOLATILITY AND PRICING 51–69 (1994) (discussing the measurement of volatility and its 
effect on the valuation of options). 
 61  The emphasis regarding the expectancy for reduction of cost may seem to stray 
away from the theory of pure real option value presented by Dixit & Pindyck (supra. n. 
2). Dixit and Pindyck emphasize the value of waiting per-se, without assuming an 
expectancy for an increase in the value of the underlying asset. Yet also according to 
Dixit & Pindyck the waiting has to generate a positive expectancy over a certain 
threshold in order that it would justify postponing the investment (supra, at 136-37). 
The fact that there is some expectancy for obtaining more information by waiting is 
not sufficient for justifying the waiting. While the waiting generates the benefit of the 
greater expectancy for valuable information, it also is accompanied by the cost of the 
time value of resources that is lost by waiting with the investment. Obtaining the 
product of the investment sooner has greater value than obtaining it later. Thus in 
order for the waiting to have a net positive value, the value of the positive expectancy 
the waiting generates has to surpass the time value of resources that is lost. 
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I will clarify this point through a two period model—t1 and t2.  
Graph 1 below describes the deadweight effect of a tax in t1.  The pre-
tax supply curve—S—rises as the price increases.  The graph St signifies 
the post-tax demand curve.  The assumption behind the graph is that 
the country in which production takes place is a small open economy 
and, thus, the price that producers face is P*, the world price for each 
unit of natural resources.  Given the tax, the equilibrium shifts from 
E1, in which the quantity of resources explored and produced will be 
Q1, to E2, in which the quantity of resources explored and produced 

















The equilibrium in t2, given that technological improvements have 
reduced costs of exploration and production, is path dependent on 
whether a tax has been imposed at time t1, and is described in Graph 
2 below.  St1 signifies the basic supply curve given that a tax has been 
levied in both t1 and t2.  It is similar to the post-tax supply curve in t1; 
besides its starting point, production is positive only when the price is 
above P*.  All the natural resource units for which the costs of 
exploration and extraction were lower than P* have been extracted in 
t1, assuming an increasing marginal cost function.  The supply curve 
S2—which applies to a scenario where there were no taxes in t1 and the 
taxes have been introduced only in t2—looks a bit different.  It is 
located a bit higher than S1—quantity supplied under any price would 
be lower than the quantity supplied under t1.  The reason for this is 
that the marginal units that would have been produced if the price was 
a bit higher than P* under the S1 curve will not be produced under the 
S 
Graph 1 - Deadweight Loss of Tax on Natural 
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supply curve S2.  This is because those units have already been 
discovered and produced in t1, when there were no taxes and the cost 
the producer faced was lower.  Thus, the quantity that will be supplied 
under the supply function S1 in t2 will be lower than under the supply 
function S2.  The maximum gap between the two supply functions S’1 
and S’2 for the quantity supplied given a certain price is the difference 
between the production in t1 with no taxes and the production with 
taxes.62  Below, Graph 2 illustrates the maximum possible gap between 
S’1 and S’2.  The difference in the quantities supplied under S’1 and S’2 
(Q3-Q4) equals the difference between the quantities produced in t1 
with taxes and the quantities produced in t1 without taxes.  While the 
difference between Q3 and Q4 could be smaller than the difference 
between Q1 and Q2, it cannot be greater. 
 

















It should be noted that if there were no technological 
improvements, no resource units would have been discovered and 
produced—the reservation price both under S1 and S2 are higher than 
the given world price of P*.  The interesting result is that given 
 
 62  The gap cannot be higher than the gap between production with tax and 
production without tax in t1, but could definitely be smaller.  This depends on the 
extent to which the costs of exploration are reduced by innovations in technology.  If 
the reduction of costs is less significant than shown in graph 2, then the supply curve 
S’1 will move to the left, and thus the gap between S’1 and S’2 in the quantity of 
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technological improvement, the taxes imposed in period t1 will 
generate a surplus in t2 that is signified by the striped triangle.  
Counterintuitively, in theory, the surplus in t2 might even exceed in the 
deadweight loss in t1 and, thus, in total, the taxes imposed in t1 might 
surprisingly generate an overall surplus.  The reason for this 
counterintuitive result is that the tax in t1 postpones exploration and 
production of some of the units to t2, in which a significant amount of 
units are produced for a lower cost. 
It is important to emphasize that the argument of this Article is 
not based on the assumption that the tax in t1 may generate a surplus 
by postponing production to a period with lower costs.  It is based on 
a much weaker assertion: the deadweight is overestimated.  The time 
value of resources which is lost by postponing production might be 
greater than the reduction in costs from technological improvement.  
As discussed above, even if the tax still generates a deadweight loss 
overall, the fact that it is smaller than estimated without taking the 
option value into account can have the effect of turning a supposedly 
inefficient tax into an efficient tax. 
Even though the core argument in this Article does not require 
that the tax generate an overall surplus, such a scenario deserves to be 
discussed as an interesting possibility that stems from the analysis of real 
option value.  Even as a mere possibility, it raises the question: how can 
it be theoretically possible that the tax generates a surplus?  If 
postponing exploration and production due to the lower expected 
costs in the future generates a surplus, why wouldn’t the private firms 
postpone exploration and production in order to maximize their 
private profits in a tax-free world?  The theoretical possibility that the 
tax may generate a surplus relies on the assumption that private firms 
would not necessarily capture the surplus by delaying exploration and 
production anyway.  Of course, this is a problematic assumption that is 
not congruent with the assumption underlying classical economic 
analysis that players will maximize their utility under the conditions of 
a free market. 
Even if there seems to be expected gains from postponing 
production, there are three possible reasons why private firms would 
not necessarily postpone exploration or production.  The first is due 
to the economic structure of the lease agreements for the exploration 
of tracts.  After making the highest “bonus bid” for a tract and receiving 
the right to explore for oil and gas in the tract, firms still have to pay 
rent on the tract.  A bonus bid payment in the U.S. isn’t symbolic as in 
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other countries: it has one of the highest rates per acre in the world.63  
Thus, even if for a firm the expected value of producing the resources 
in the future is higher, when factoring in the additional rent payments, 
the overall expected value of producing in the present may be higher.  
The firm can circumvent this cost by bidding for the tract only in the 
future, but by then some other firm may have made a bid.  Thus, the 
firm will prefer making the bid in the present over making it in the 
future when the expected gains will be higher—better to have one bird 
in the hand than two in the bush. 
This raises a separate question regarding the economic 
desirability of the government policy of charging a rent on tracts.  It 
seems to cause an inefficient outcome, distorting the optimal 
production pattern by incentivizing firms to produce in the present 
when the expected gains from producing in the future are higher.  Yet, 
imposing rent payments may still be economically justifiable.  Firstly, 
having a right to explore a tract may generate negative externalities by 
limiting the public usage of the tract.  The rent payment may be a way 
of internalizing this externality.  This consideration is actually reflected 
in the DOI’s reports, and is the central rationale behind the increase 
in the rent payments.64 
Secondly, the government may have an additional interest in 
restricting the firm’s decision of when to produce after it has leased a 
tract.  The government has an interest in maintaining a national 
stockpile of energy resources.65  Enabling firms that have leased tracts 
to freely decide when to extract adds significant uncertainty in 
assessing and controlling the amount of national energy resources.  
Although even after leasing a certain quantity of tracts the government 
does not know the potential production of the leases, enabling firms 
to freely decide when to produce adds an additional dimension of 
uncertainty and significantly increases the overall uncertainty over the 
amount of resources that would be extracted in a given period.  
Essentially, this source of uncertainty is also a negative externality that 




 63  Johnston, supra note 16, at 50.   
 64  FINAL REPORT: POLICIES TO AFFECT THE PACE OF LEASING AND REVENUES IN THE 
GULF OF MEXICO, supra note 23, at 9, 28. 
 65  See Paul N. Leiby, Estimating the Energy Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports, 
OAK RIDGE NAT’L LABORATORY 3–4 (Feb. 2007), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/otaq/renewablefuels/ornl-tm-2007-028.pdf (analyzing the benefits of 
energy security).  
LIBSON(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:26 PM 
2015] IS THE DEADWEIGHT ACTUALLY DEAD? 857 
The second reason why a firm would not postpone production is 
the time value of resources.  Even if the cost would be lower if firms 
postponed production to t2, the gains may not be sufficient to offset 
the loss of the time value of resources they have lost by postponing 
exploration and production to t2.  Accordingly, it is not correct to 
determine that, overall, non-exploration in t1 would generate a surplus.  
When taking into account the firm’s time value of resources, imposing 
the tax may result in a loss in present value terms.  This difference 
between the firm’s discount rate and the discount rate of social 
institutions may result from the different time horizons with which 
these entities are concerned.  Social institutions have a more distant 
time horizon, which studies have demonstrated is accompanied by a 
lower discount rate.  Private firms have a closer time horizon, which is 
accompanied by a higher discount rate.66 
The third answer is that even though there is an expected surplus 
from postponing exploration and production to t2, private firms would 
not postpone production due to risk aversion.67  A central source of 
uncertainty for firms is government regulation.  Private firms cannot 
rely on the projections for taxation in t2, and thus even if the expected 
cost reducing technology will materialize, they might still find 
themselves with lower post-tax revenue in t2.  The government is not 
exposed to any risk in this respect, due to the fact that it controls the 
decision.  Besides regulatory uncertainty, firms may be risk averse in 
response to the uncertainty of future innovations, and thus may prefer 
the secure payoffs in t1 to the probabilistic higher payoffs in t2.  
Governments may be less risk averse than private firms, and thus may 
prefer the higher expected payoffs to the lower and secure payoffs 
resulting from imposing a tax in t1.
68 
 
 66  For experiments demonstrating the correlation between the distance of the 
horizon and the discount rate, see S. Fredrick, G. Loewenstein & T. O’Donoghue, Time 
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002).  
Regarding the view that the government’s discount rate should be lower than the 
market’s discount rate, so that no generation is favored over the other, see Robert 
Solow, The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 10 
(1974) See also Tyler Cowen, Caring About the Distant Future: Why It Matters and What It 
Means, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 5–6 (2007). 
 67  Even in publicly traded firms, in which the shareholders are risk neutral as a 
result of the diversification of their portfolios, the managers who make the investment 
decisions tend to be risk averse.  See John Coffee Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The 
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (1986); John Coffee Jr., Systematic 
Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond 
Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 807 (2011). 
 68  Regarding government’s abilities to manage risk, see DAVID MOSS, WHEN 
EVERYTHING ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 1–2 (2002); 
compare BARBARA VIS, POLITICS OF RISK TAKING: WELFARE STATE REFORM IN ADVANCED 
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Taking into account the real option value that a tax may generate 
has a significant impact on the analysis of deadweight loss in particular 
and tax policy in general, especially in cases for which there is a strong 
expectancy for technological development.  This Part has discussed 
taxation of gas and oil as a classic case of the significant impact of real 
option value.  The next Part will substantiate the claim that there is a 
strong expectancy for technological developments in the gas and oil 
exploration and production sector that make it the classic example for 
real option value. 
V.  SUBSTANTIATING THE STRONG EXPECTANCY FOR A REDUCTION IN 
COSTS 
While every tax may yield new possible scenarios for the future by 
preventing some economic activity from taking place in the present, 
the value of these new scenarios may be positive or negative.  Without 
additional information one cannot conclude whether the value of the 
new set of possible scenarios is higher than the value of the possible 
scenarios before the tax was imposed.  For this reason, they are 
disregarded in the economic analysis of taxation.  In the case of 
taxation of gas and oil, there are firm grounds to believe that the value 
of the new set of possible scenarios is significantly higher than the value 
of the scenarios in which the tax hasn’t been imposed.  The reason for 
this is the strong expectancy that significant technological 
developments will occur in the near future which will reduce 
substantially the cost of extracting gas and oil from a given tract.  In 
this Part I will provide the reasons for the strong expectancy of 
significant reduction in costs. 
One of the primary indications of future reductions in the cost of 
extraction of gas and oil resulting from technological developments is 
the projection of the U.S. Energy Information Agency through its 
National Energy Modeling System (Graph 3).  According to the 
projection made by the EIA, in 2020 technological progress will 
increase United States domestic natural gas output by 2.5 trillion cubic 
feet.69  The model calculates the expected effect of technological 
 
DEMOCRACIES 166–69 (2010) (claiming that prospect theory and risk preferences apply 
the same way to government as they apply to individuals). 
 69  Ted McCallister, Impact of Unconventional Gas Technology in the Annual Energy 
Outlook 2000, ENERGY INFOR. ADMIN. 12–13 (2000), available at http:// 
webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/4265704/FID3754/pdf/m
ulti/uncongas.pdf.  The methodology used in the estimation is based on profiling the 
resources into undeveloped resources, proved resources (resources that “geological 
and engineering data demonstrate with reasonable certainty to be recoverable in 
future years from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating 
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developments under 11 categories70 in accordance to the 
developments that are projected in the field, and that may mature and 
be implemented over the next several years.  The model evaluates the 
possible effect of each of these categories on the existing reserves and 
on the industry’s ability to turn undeveloped resources into proved 
resources, and proved resources into resources “in-play.”  
Development and drilling technologies have the greatest expected 
impact on the future production of natural gas—increasing output by 
11.4 trillion cubic feet.71  Meanwhile, technological developments in 
the exploration phase are expected to increase output by 5.7 trillion 
cubic feet,72 and technological developments in the production phase 
are estimated to increase output by 9.2 trillion cubic feet.73 
It is illuminating to compare the projections of increased 
production from technological advancement made in 2000 to the 
actual output in recent years.  In 2007 the actual unconventional gas 
production was lower than projected: approximately 4 trillion cubic 
feet74 in comparison to the estimated 5.1.75  By 2008 the gap had 
disappeared—the forecast and the actual output were fairly close: the 
former 5.1 trillion cubic feet76 and the latter 4.9.77  From 2009 onwards, 
 
conditions,”) and resources which are “in play.”  Id. at 3. The technological 
developments are comprised of eleven categories that encompass the full spectrum of 
key disciplines: geology, engineering, operations and the environment and affect 
exploration, development of wells, and production.  The following categories affect 
exploration efficiency: basin assessments; play-specific extended reservoir 
characterization, advanced exploration and natural fracture detection R & D.  The 
following categories affect well-development efficiency: geology/technology modeling 
and matching, more effective lower damage well completion and simulation 
technology, targeted drilling and hydraulic fracturing R & D and advanced well 
completion technologies such as cavitation, horizontal drilling, and multilateral wells.  
The following categories affect production efficiency: advanced well performance 
diagnostics and remediation, new practices and technology for gas and water 
treatment, other unconventional gas technologies such as enhanced gas shale recovery 
using nitrogen or carbon dioxide injection, mitigation of environmental and other 
constraints on development.  Id. at 3–4. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at 9. 
 72  Id. at 6. 
 73  Id. at 12. 
 74  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL GAS ANNUAL 2011, at 9 (2011), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/annual/pdf/nga11.pdf [hereinafter NATURAL GAS 
ANNUAL 2011].  The total above for the actual unconventional natural production was 
derived by adding the amount produced from coalbed wells (1.99 trillion cubic feet) 
to the amount produced from shale gas wells (1.99 trillion cubic feet).  Id. 
 75  McCallister, supra note 69, at 13. 
 76  Id. 
 77  NATURAL GAS ANNUAL 2011, supra note 74.  Production from coalbed wells stood 
at 2.022 trillion cubic feet and shale gas wells produced 2.87 cubic feet of natural gas.  
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a reverse gap has developed in which actual output substantially 
exceeds the projection.  In 2009 the actual unconventional gas 
production reached 6 trillion cubic feet in comparison to the 
projected 5.15 trillion cubic feet.78  In 2011 the actual unconventional 
gas production grew to an astonishing 10.3 trillion cubic feet,79 not only 
exceeding the projection for 2011 by approximately 5.3 trillion cubic 
feet, but exceeding even the projection for 2020 which was 7.5 trillion 
cubic feet.80  In short, not only did past projections of technological 
development not exaggerate the impact of technological development 
on output, but they have even greatly underestimated the increased 
capacity over time, especially after several years. 
Needless to say, current projections for unconventional gas 
production, on which technological developments have the greatest 
impact, increased significantly from the estimations made in 2000.  
The current estimate for natural gas production from unconventional 
sources in 2020 has more than doubled, from the 7.2 trillion cubic feet 
estimated in 2000 to 17.7 trillion cubic feet estimated in 2012.81  In 
2035, natural gas production from unconventional sources is projected 
to reach an astonishing level of 21.5 trillion cubic feet.82  This increase 
is mostly due to the growth rate in the production of shale gas, 
projected to increase an average of 4.1% per year between 2010 and 
2035.83 
It should be noted that the increase in the expected output due 
to technological developments is not proportionate to the expected 
increase in producers’ revenue streams.  Revenue is expected to rise at 
a much slower pace because the technological developments are 
expected to decrease energy prices.  According to the national 
modeling energy system, the technological developments in the 
exploration phase are expected to decrease the wellhead price of a 
thousand cubic feet of natural gas by 17 cents in 2020 compared to a 
scenario with no technological developments.84  In the case of the 
 
Id. 
 78  McCallister, supra note 69, at 13. 
 79  NATURAL GAS ANNUAL 2011, supra note 74.  Production from coalbed wells 
amounted to 1.78 trillion cubic feet and production from shale gas wells amounted to 
8.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.  Id. 
 80  McCallister, supra note 69, at 13. 
 81  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, at 159 (2012), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383 (2012).pdf. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id.  
 84  McCallister, supra note 69, at 6, 20 (projected price with technological 
advancement is $2.81, and without is $2.98). 
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development and drilling phase, they are expected to decrease the 
price by 33 cents and in the production phase by 23 cents.85  Assuming 
the technological development takes place in all phases, the wellhead 
price of a thousand of cubic feet of gas is estimated to be 78 cents lower 
than under a scenario in which no technological development takes 
place.86 



















The significant and ongoing effects of technological progress on 
the cost involved in the production of natural resources are not 
restricted to the natural gas industry, but also pertain to oil production, 
especially from off-shore sources.88  Fagan found an 18% annual 
 
 85  Id. at 12, 20 (projected price with technological advancement is $2.81, and 
without development and enhanced drilling technology is $3.14, and without 
production enhanced technology is $3.04). 
 86  Id. at 13, 20 (projected price with technological advancement is $2.81, and 
without is $2.03). 
 87 AEO 2000 NATIONAL ENERGY MODELING SYSTEM, runs BASINS D060600A and 
UGRT04.D051600A, graph available at http://www.sitterdrilling.com/docs/ 
DOE_gas_production_increases_by_use_of_technology_on_unconventional_shales.p
df, at 13 (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).  
 88  Measurement of technological advancement is a prerequisite for exploring the 
impact of technological advancement on the costs of exploration, development, and 
production of natural resources.  Often, this involves using the expenditures on R&D 
as a proxy for technological advancement.  See, e.g., Zvi Grilliches, Productivity, R&D 
and Basic Research at the Firm Level in the 1970’s, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 92 (1986).  The 
Graph 3 
Projected Effect of All Unconventional Gas 
Technologies on Unconventional Gas Production 
1998–2020 
LIBSON (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:26 PM 
862 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:833 
decrease in costs in the off-shore oil industry between the years 1977 
and 1994, more than offsetting the increase in costs due to depletion, 
which was assessed to have climbed to an annual rate of 12% in the 
same period.89  Forbes and Zampelli examined the success rate of gas 
and oil explorations that had a direct impact on the costs per unit 
between 1981 and 1995 in the Gulf of Mexico.  They found an 
extraordinary 8.3% annual growth in success rate between 1985 and 
1995.90  Furthermore, Managi, Opaluch, Jin, and Grigalunas found a 
constant increase in the gross total factor productivity (TFP) in the 
production of gas and oil in the Gulf of Mexico in the 49 years between 
1948 and 1997, averaging an annual increase of 1.2%.91  As they note,92 
this rate is significantly higher than the general increase of the gross 
TFP in the economy estimated by Färe, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang.93  
In a subsequent study, Managi, Opaluch, and Grigalunas analyzed the 
effect of technology on costs in the exploration phase.  They used the 
 
assumption that there is a direct link between one’s investment in technology and the 
technological output has been much contested.  See Zvi Grilliches, Productivity R&D 
and the Data Constraint, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1994).  The second method is to use 
patent counts as a proxy for technological advancements.  See J. Schmookler, The Level 
of Inventive Activity, 36 REV. ECON. STAT. 183 (1954).  This method was refined in order 
to account for the variance in the commercial applicability of different patents by 
counting citations to a patent.  See B.H. Hall, A.B. Jaffe & M. Trajtenberg, The NBER 
Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools, (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf.  A third method, concentrating on the 
petroleum industry, was developed by Cuddington & Moss, accounting for the 
diffusion of technology in the market by constructing an index counting reports on 
technological innovation in the industry’s trade journals.  J.T. Cuddington & D.L. 
Moss, Technological Change, Depletion and the U.S. Petroleum Industry: A New Approach to 
Measurement and Estimation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1135 (2001). 
 89  M.N. Fagan, Resource Depletion and Technical Change: Effects on U.S. Crude Oil 
Findings Costs from 1977 to 1994, 18 ENERGY J. 91, 98 (1997).   
 90  K.F. Forbes & E. M. Zampelli, Technology and the Exploratory Success Rate in the U.S. 
Offshore, 21 ENERGY J. 109, 118–19 (2000). 
 91  S. Managi, J.J. Opaluch, D. Jin & T.A. Grigalunas, Technological Change and 
Depletion in Offshore Oil and Gas, 47 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 388, 403 (2004).  Their 
central finding that the net TFP is a U-shaped curve is not of interest to this Article.  
The net TFP takes into account the depletion of resources, and the depletion of 
resources is of no concern to this Article.  The point of this paper is that the costs for 
a given resource decrease overtime due to technological developments.  The deadweight 
loss of a tax that eliminates the exploitation of a resource in the present is lower than 
perceived because there is a strong likelihood that in the future the same resource will 
be utilized due to the technological improvements that will lead to lower costs.  The 
gross TFP and not the net TFP is of relevance for the measurement of future estimated 
costs of certain resources. 
 92  Id. 
 93  R. Färe, S. Grosskopf, M. Norris & Z. Zhang, Productivity Growth, Technical 
Progress and Efficiency Change in Industrialized Countries, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 66, 80–81 
(1994). 
LIBSON(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:26 PM 
2015] IS THE DEADWEIGHT ACTUALLY DEAD? 863 
data from of the Joint Association Survey on Drilling Costs published 
by the American Petroleum Institute regarding offshore drilling costs 
between 1955 and 1996.  They found that technology also had a 
significant impact on reducing the costs of the exploration phase.94 
The conclusion that emerges from the studies above is that there 
is a very strong expectancy that technological advancements in the 
future will decrease the costs of exploration, development, and 
production of natural resources, especially oil and natural gas in 
offshore drilling.  This probability should have a significant impact on 
the design of taxes on natural resources, as the next Part will 
demonstrate. 
VI.  IGNORING OPTION VALUE AND REAL OPTION VALUE 
Considering the findings outlined above, why is option value so 
often overlooked and ignored?  Although a few studies have shown that 
option value is often not taken into account in various fields of legal 
policy, the cause of this omission still needs to be explained.  This 
Article aims to fill that gap by arguing that our tendency to overlook 
option value stems from a wider phenomenon that has also received 
attention in legal scholarship: a general tendency to focus on static 
analysis, based on historical data, and a failure to detect dynamic 
elements that change over time.  A static analysis aims at adopting the 
policy that will enhance social welfare given certain conditions.  A 
dynamic analysis takes into account how such a policy might itself 
change those conditions over time, and thus how its effects might 
substantially differ from those predicted by a static analysis.  The 
dynamic model exposes how the equilibrium that the static model 
predicts is only a temporary equilibrium and thus not as significant as 
the static model portrays.95 
As it typically happens in the economic analysis of the law, the 
relatively recent trend of focusing on dynamic analysis has mainly 
originated from the field of antitrust law.96  David Evans and Keith 
 
 94  Shunsuke Managi, James J.Opaluch & Thomas A. Grigalunas, Technological 
Change and Petroleum Exploration in the Gulf of Mexico, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 619, 629 (2005). 
 95  DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 508 (2012). 
 96  Antitrust scholarship has pioneered the way for general law and economics 
analysis since its inception.  In the conventional account of the historical development 
of law and economics analysis, Aaron Director’s course in law and economics in the 
1930’s at the University of Chicago Law School is seen as the origin of the law and 
economics movement.  As Harold Demsetz notes, only in the early 1960’s did “[t]he 
interaction of law and economics burst beyond the narrower confines of the antitrust 
area.”  See Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and economics at 
Chicago 1932–1970, 26 J. L. & ECON. 163, 191 (1983); see also Ejan Mackaay, History of 
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Hylton were the first scholars to note the deficiency in most static 
antitrust models, which overlooked important possible effects since 
they did not admit a dynamic element.97  More specifically, Gregory 
Sidak and David Teece argue that the static models of competition in 
antitrust do not account for effects associated with competition such 
as the introduction of new products, new features, and new pricing 
methods.98  Joseph Harrington argues that under a dynamic model that 
does not focus only on one time period, the penalty multiple required 
to deter corporations from colluding is two to three times smaller in 
size than in a static model.99  Judge Douglas Ginsburg and Professor 
Joshua Wright pointed out that the need for incorporating dynamic 
models into antitrust legal scholarship is broadly accepted among 
scholars, and the main question now is how such incorporation should 
take place.100 
The need to incorporate dynamic analysis into the study of legal 
institutions has permeated other fields—mainly environmental law, 
but other legal fields as well.  For example, David Dreisen emphasized 
the need for environmental law to be based on dynamic models that 
take into account changes in consumption patterns over time and the 
effects of current policies on future innovation.101  Dreisen also 
demonstrated how dynamic economic analysis could contribute to the 
optimal management of infrastructural commons, including 
environmental resources, by taking into account their evolution over 
time.102 
The cognitive error of conflating present value and option value 
might also explain the neglect of option value: an erroneous inference 
that an option for developing a project in the future is worthless 
because it does not have positive economic value in the present.  This 
inference may be true under a static analysis, in which we assume there 
 
Law and Economics, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 65, 72 (2000). 
 97  David Evans & Keith Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power 
and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, 203, 240 
(2008). 
 98  J. Gregory Sidak & David F. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 602 (2009). 
 99  Joseph Harrington, Who Should be the Target of Cartel Sanctions?: Comment on 
Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 41, 44 (2010). 
 100  Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua Wright, Dynamic Analysis & the Limits of Antitrust 
Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2 (2012). 
 101  David Driesen, Symposium: Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law and the Static 
Efficiency: The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Emission 
Trading and Priority-Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501, 507–09 (2004). 
 102  David Driesen, An Economic Dynamic Approach to the Infrastructure Commons, 35 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 215, 217–19 (2008). 
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are no grounds to believe that any of the exogenous circumstances 
significant for the economic outcome will change in the future.  Under 
such an assumption the future value will not depart substantially from 
the present value, hence an option to obtain the future outcome 
cannot be of significant value: the difference in outcome will be 
worthless in the future similarly to its present value.  An option to 
obtain a worthless outcome is worthless.  In contrast, in cases in which 
there are firm grounds to believe that in the future the circumstances 
will change so that the project will have positive economic value, the 
option value may substantially depart from the present value.  
Generally, it might be true that there are no grounds to believe that 
circumstances will change significantly in one way or the other.  While 
the value of the underlying asset may increase in the future, it may also 
decrease.  But as I have noted above, in the case of oil and gas, there 
are good grounds to believe that a positive option value will emerge in 
the future. 
In addition to a standard cognitive error account, overlooking the 
option value could be explained through the focusing illusion bias.  
According to Schkade and Kahneman, the focusing illusion happens 
“when a judgment about an entire object or category is made with 
attention focused on a subset of that category . . . the attended subset 
is overweighed relative to the unattended subset.”103  Wilson et al. have 
extended the application of the focusing illusion to cases in which an 
individual focuses on the occurrence in question, and fails to consider 
the consequences of other events that are likely to occur.104  Wilson’s 
description seems to fit perfectly with the case we are concerned with—
the consequences of a tax.  The occurrence in question is the 
economic effect of the tax.  The evident and direct effect of the tax is 
its distortionary effect—eliminating certain beneficial transactions that 
would have taken place in a tax-free world.  Scholars have focused on 
this direct effect of taxation, but neglected to account for an additional 
 
 103  David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People 
Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 340 (1998).  
Schade & Kahneman demonstrate the focusing illusion through a famous experiment 
in which they ask students from the Midwest and California questions regarding the 
life satisfaction of a similar individual from the other region.  Participants rated the 
life satisfaction of Californians higher, although there was no difference in the self-
reporting of life satisfaction of the students from the two regions.  Schade and 
Kahneman reasoned that climate-related aspects are an easily observed difference 
between the regions and participants tended to focus on it (hence the focusing 
illusion), although in reality climate does not actually have much impact on life 
satisfaction.  
 104  Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective 
Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821, 822 (2000). 
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consequence: the option value the tax may generate by enabling an 
economic activity to take place in the future.  The phenomenon of the 
focusing illusion is related to an additional phenomenon that could 
explain the neglect of dynamic analysis in general: people’s tendency 
to give disproportionate weight to accessible information and to focus 
on what comes easily to mind.105  This can explain our tendency to 
ignore the possibility of a dynamic model: a result of its complexity and 
its concern with remote contingencies in time—information that 
people tend to ignore. 
The focus on costs when analyzing the effect of taxation is 
reminiscent of a similar tendency in tort law.  Professor William Bishop 
has underscored how, counter-intuitively, the occurrence of a tort can 
generate an economic benefit.  The occurrence of a tort that causes an 
economic harm, like loss of income to a business, may generate an 
opportunity to benefit to its rivals.106  Bishop argues that that may be 
the justification for excluding compensation in cases of economic 
harms: as a rule of thumb, these torts do not necessarily cause social 
cost—the revenue lost by one business may just end up in the hand of 
its rivals.107  Due to the fact that such losses to third parties are not a 
social cost, from the perspective of the tortfeasor’s optimal level of care 
and level of activity it is not desirable that the tortfeasor will internalize 
such consequences.  The example Bishop discusses is of a train 
accident that causes the citizens of town A to move to town B due to a 
leakage of poisonous substances, and as a result, the businesses of town 
A lose all their revenue.108  In such a case, the harm to the businesses 
of town A is not necessarily a social cost, due to a possible shift of 




 105  See Norbert Schwartz, Feelings as Information: Informational and Motivational 
Functions of Affective States, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION 527 (R. 
Sorrrentino & E.T. Higgins eds., 1990); E.T. Higgins, Knowledge Activation: Accessibility, 
Applicability and Salience, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 133 
(E.T. Higgins & A. Kruglanski eds., 1996). 
 106  W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL S. 1, 3 (1982). 
 107  Id. at 4–7 (assuming the costs for the rival business are similar to those of the 
harmed business—that marginal costs do not increase with scale). 
 108  Id. at 5–6. 
 109  The most striking counterintuitive implication of Bishop’s analysis is his 
assertion that, in the circumstances he analyzes, the moral hazard of insurance does 
not generate a social cost.  Even if a business loses revenue due to its own reckless 
behavior, as long as there are other businesses that could profit from that loss without 
higher costs than that of the initial business, this reckless behavior does not generate 
any social cost.  See id. at 9–10. 
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Similar to Bishop’s observations regarding the possible positive 
consequences of a tort that should be taken into account, this Article 
points out the possible side-benefits of a tax.  Both torts and taxation 
are perceived as representing negative events; their consequences are 
comprised primarily of costs.  Although this is generally true, in both 
cases this perception may cause us to overlook possible side-benefits, 
such as the emerging business opportunities for third parties as a 
consequence of economic harm in the case of torts, and the option 
value for future exploration with lower costs in the case of taxation of 
natural resources.  In both cases there is still a net social cost, but taking 
into account the side-benefits may have a substantial effect on policy—
excluding compensation for economic harm in the case of torts and 
increasing the tax rate in the case of taxation on natural resources.  
Although Bishop did not address any cognitive biases in his article, 
Kahneman’s110 and Wilson’s111 cognitive analyses can provide a unified 
explanation of why both the point Bishop illuminates, as well as the 
option value of taxes discussed in this article, have been overlooked. 
VII.  POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
A. Option Value of Present Exploration 
In this Article I have presented the option value that may be 
generated by not exploiting the field in the present.  Even if one 
accepts this conclusion, taking into account real option value might 
not necessarily decrease the deadweight of taxation as claimed in this 
Article, and might actually increase it.  Real option value might also be 
generated by the exploitation of a field, and not only from non-
exploitation.  For example, the exploitation of a field might also open 
valuable options that wouldn’t have existed if the field had not been 
exploited.  These additional options that emerged by exploitation 
might add substantial value to the exploitation of the field, in addition 
to the market value of the resource itself.  The additional resources 
might turn a country into a resource independent country, and thus 
have a significant impact on its foreign policy and role in world trade.112  
 
 110  See supra note 103. 
 111  See supra note 104. 
 112  Regarding economic benefits of energy independence as a significant 
consideration for energy policy, see Randolph Comstock, FUA: The Transition to 
Alternative Fuels in the Industrial and Electric Utility Sectors, 29 KAN. L. REV. 337, 364 (1981).  
Regarding the effect of energy dependence on the U.S. foreign affairs policy, see James 
Woolsey & Anne Korin, Turning Oil into Salt, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 25, 2007), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/222256/turning-oil-salt-r-james-woolsey-
anne-korin.  For reference to the benefits of energy independence in both the 
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In addition, the resources produced may tilt a country over a tipping 
point that has a significant impact on the state such as scale advantages 
that enable the country to decrease costs of production in its region.113  
Last but not least, the exploitation itself might generate new drilling 
technology, by conveying significant information on the connection 
between the geologic structures in the area exploited and the 
likelihood of finding natural resources in such structures.  This option 
value of exploitation may be generated even in case of failure to 
produce natural resources from the field.114 
An empirically supported source of the option value of 
exploitation is the option to sell oil and gas at current prices—an 
option that only extraction enables firms to execute.115  There are 
reasonable grounds supported by data for the claim that the option to 
sell under current prices is of significantly higher value than the option 
to sell under future prices.  It has already been noted that a side effect 
of technological advancements is a decrease in the price of the natural 
resource: the greater productivity increases the supply and reduces the 
price.  That effect alone is not necessarily sufficient to offset the 
positive option value of technological development;116 an additional 
source for an expected decrease in future prices is a projected decline 
in the demand for natural resources, especially fossil fuels, due to 
substitute goods such as solar energy and greater productivity in the 
use of natural resources.117 
 
economic sphere and the foreign policy sphere, see Ariel Cohen,, Ukraine’s Economic 
Benefits from Integration into the Euro-Atlantic Community, HERITAGE.ORG (June 12, 2007), 
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/ukraines-economic-benefits-
from-integration-into-the-euro-atlantic-community. 
 113  For an example of a similar “tipping point” effect, see Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew 
Warner, The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth, 59 J. DEVELOPMENT ECON. 43, 
43–44 (1999). 
 114  See Alwyn Young, Invention and Bounded Learning by Doing, 101 J. POL. ECON. 443 
(1993) (discussing experience as a significant factor for advancing technology). 
 115  It is possible to some extent to receive a price close to current prices for future 
production by obtaining a put option.  Yet if it is common knowledge that there is a 
strong probability that prices will decrease, the put option will more likely reflect the 
lower prices than the current high prices. 
 116  See McCallister, supra note 69, at 6, 12, 20. 
 117  It is instructive to note that under certain circumstances the greater productivity 
of natural resources such as fossil fuels might increase consumption, a phenomenon 
labeled in the scholarship as the “rebound effect.”  The greater productivity reduces 
the quantity of natural resources needed for a given purpose, reducing the price of 
the activity for which the natural resource is used and thus increasing the overall 
consumption of the natural resource.  The classic example of the rebound effect is the 
case of car usage of fuel.  The enhanced fuel efficiency of cars, increasing the miles 
per gallon ratio, reduces the per-mile price of driving and thus may increase the 
amount of mileage driven and increase the overall consumption of oil.  For a 
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Overall, there are many possible sources for option value in the 
reverse direction from the one suggested in this Article—option value 
that stems from the exploitation of resource fields.  Taking into 
account such options will alter significantly the analysis provided in this 
Article. 
There are two ways of presenting this objection to the Article’s 
argument: a strong version and a weak one.  The strong version raises 
questions regarding the general methodology of a dynamic model that 
incorporates option value into the economic analysis of deadweight 
loss: that option value might tilt the balance in both directions.  The 
fact that there are endless scenarios for how option value might be 
generated just reflects how messy a dynamic analysis that takes option 
value into account can be, and raises the question of whether this 
analysis can actually lead to fruitful results. 
The weak version of this objection does not question the general 
dynamic analysis methodology, but only the specific conclusion that 
taking option value into account decreases the deadweight loss of the 
tax on natural resources and justifies increasing the tax rate.  The 
possibilities mentioned above demonstrate that it is possible that the 
option value may actually increase the deadweight loss of taxation due 
to non-exploitation.  According to the weak-version objection, there is 
no fundamental methodological problem with a dynamic analysis of 
deadweight loss that takes real option value into account; the problem 
is only that this Article’s proposed model is too limited and does not 
fully incorporate real-world option value into its analysis.  It cherry-
picks the option value of non-exploitation while pushing aside the 
option value that may accompany exploitation. 
While the strong version of this objection is ultimately 
unpersuasive, the weaker version raises important questions that 
should prompt further research.  Simply put, the strong version 
objection, which calls for a wholesale rejection of the dynamic analysis 
methodology employed in this Article, is itself too simplistic.  The fact 
that the dynamic analysis called for in this Article is fairly complex, and 
has to consider a vast amount of possible sources of option value 
working in different directions, is not a reason to abandon it.  If one 
admits that taking option value into account may have a significant 
impact on the analysis of taxation’s deadweight loss, one simply has to 
attempt to take it into account, no matter how complex the analysis.  
To paraphrase the saying mostly attributed to Maynard Keynes118 and 
 
discussion of the rebound effect, see Kenneth A. Small & Kurt Van Dender, Fuel 
Efficiency and Motor Vehicle Travel: The Declining Rebound Effect, 28 ENERGY J. 25 (2007). 
 118  ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 20 (2010).  
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Amartya Sen,119 but originally phrased by the philosopher Carveth 
Read, it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong.120 
The softer version of the objection above raises more serious 
concerns.  One could not object to the possibility that option value may 
be generated through exploitation as well as through abstention.  The 
indications for option value stemming from exploitation, however, are 
not as strong as the indications for option value stemming from non-
exploitation.  There are many studies regarding technological 
advancements in the natural resources sector, and the projection that 
such advancements will continue in the future is widely accepted.121  In 
contrast, there are not many studies regarding most of the sources for 
option value stemming from field exploration.  There are some studies 
showing the technological experience gained by exploration—
”learning by doing.”122  While there are studies that assert that future 
natural resources prices, especially natural gas and oil, will decline, 
these assertions are highly contestable among scholars.123 
The analysis in this Article, however, does not pretend to be 
exhaustive.  It only presents the basic model for such an analysis.  It is 
also very likely that even if the general framework presented in this 
Article is correct and the data on which it relies is not, there may be 
certain cases with unique attributes124 in which the option value of 
exploitation is greater than the option value of non-exploitation.  In 
short, the analysis presented here should provide a platform for 
further scholarship and research that takes into account the 
complexity of dynamic economic analysis of taxation in general and 
the taxation of natural resources in particular. 
B.  Is there Actually a Deadweight Loss in the Taxation of Oil and Gas? 
This Article is premised on the assumption that taxation of oil and 
gas is necessarily accompanied by deadweight loss.  I have argued that 
 
 119  LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 24 
(2002). 
 120  CARVETH READ, LOGIC, DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE 272 (1898). 
 121  See supra notes 89–91, 94. 
 122  See Young, supra note 114.   
 123  According to the basic economic model and the Hotelling Rule, prices of 
natural resources are projected to increase, see Hotelling, supra note 56.  For 
reinforcement of the classic view in the case of fossil fuels, see McCallister, supra note 
69, at 10, 12.  In contrast, Vincent, Panayotou & Hartwick project that in the long-run 
prices will decrease.  See Jeffrey Vincent, Teodore Panayotou & John M. Hartwick, 
Resource Depletion and Sustainability in Small Open Economies, 33 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 
274, 282 (1997); see also Peter Berck & Michael Roberts, Natural Resources Prices: Will 
They Ever Turn Up?, 31 J. ENTVL. ECON. & MGMT. 65, 77 (1996). 
 124  See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text. 
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given that deadweight loss is a key factor in determining a tax rate, 
incorporating option value has a significant effect on deadweight loss 
and as a result also has a significant effect on the optimal tax rate on 
oil and gas.  The existence of the deadweight effect in the exploration 
and production of natural resources in general and oil and gas in 
particular is questionable, both on the empirical level and the 
theoretical level.  On the empirical level, most of the exploration, 
development, and production of oil and gas is conducted by large 
multi-national firms that pursue many similar projects 
simultaneously.125  As a result, even if a firm loses money in a specific 
location because, for example, exploration there does not lead to any 
results, it could deduct those losses from the profits on its other 
projects.  Thus, in essence, the firm does not incur the full costs of the 
failed exploration.  The deductibility of the loss from its other profits 
is equivalent to a partial reimbursement for its investment from the 
government, equaling the tax rate on its profits. 
If the government incurs a share in the losses equivalent to the 
share it collects through taxation, the firm’s decision whether to invest 
is not distorted by taxation.  The ratio between the firm’s expected 
gains and its expected losses is identical in both a world with no taxes 
and in a world with taxes.  Assume that its expected pre-tax revenues if 
the exploration is fruitful are P*X, and its expected losses if the 
exploration fails are (1-P)*Y.  Given that the firm will be reimbursed 
for its losses at a rate that equals the tax rate on its gains, the post-tax 
 
 125  The biggest American gas and oil company, Exxon Mobil Corp (total asset value 
of $345 billion), drilled 1,163 wells in the U.S. during 2012 alone.  Chevron (the 
second biggest U.S. oil and gas company with a total asset value of $233 billion) drilled 
951 wells, and Conoco Philips (the third biggest with a total asset value of $117 billion) 
drilled 492 wells.  The company that had drilled the most is Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation (the fourth biggest U.S. oil and gas company with a total asset value of 
$64 billion dollars), which drilled 1,411 wells during 2012.  The phenomenon of 
drilling numerous wells is not limited to these conglomerates.  Even companies bellow 
the top 50 biggest companies drill tens of wells in a given year, such as Clayton Williams 
Energy Inc., the 63rd biggest with 97 wells, Fidelity Exploration & Production Co. the 
64th biggest with 67 wells, and Roseta Resources Inc. the 65th biggest with 82 wells.  
The biggest 150 oil and gas companies drilled 18,598 wells in the U.S. during 2012, 
averaging 124 wells per company.  For full information regarding the activity of the 
150 biggest oil and gas companies, see Conglin Xu & Laura Bell, OGJ 150 Earnings 
Down as US Production Climbs, 111 J. GAS & OIL 34, 46–51 (2013).  Exxon Mobil  Corp. 
is only the fourteenth both in the share of worldwide oil reserves it holds (0.7%) and 
in its share of worldwide natural gas (0.65%).  See American Petroleum Institute, 
Putting Earnings Into Perspective, at 4 (Dec. 2013), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20140327140452/ http://api.org/oil-and-natural-gas-
overview/industry-economics/~/media/Files/Statistics/Earnings-Perspective/ 
earnings-perspective-low-res.ashx (accessed by using the Way Back Machine to view the 
older version of this website). 
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ratio of its expected gains and losses will equal the pre-tax ratio of its 
expected gains and losses: 
(1-P)*Y*(1-T) : P*X*(1-T) = (1-P)*Y : P*X 
In the equation above, it is evident that the ratios of the pre-tax 
expected gains and losses (on the right side of the equation) equal 
those of the post-tax expected gains and losses (on the left hand of the 
equation)—both the numerator and the denominator are multiplied 
by the same factor—(1-t)—the firm’s post-tax share of both losses and 
gains. 
The fact that the ratio of the expected profits and losses is 
constant in both a pre-tax world and in a post-tax world essentially 
means that taxes do not distort the firm’s decision to invest in 
exploring a certain field.  The firm’s decision is based on whether the 
expected gains are lower or higher than the expected losses: 
P*X      (1-P)*Y 
The sign will not change after both sides of the equation are multiplied 
by the same factor—(1-T): 
P*X *(1-T)      (1-P)*Y*(1-T) 
This means that imposing a tax will not alter the firm’s decision 
whether or not to invest in a certain field.  The relationship between 
the two sides of the equation and the decision over whether to invest 
in production are not affected by the tax rate, or by whether there is 
any tax imposed. 
This in and of itself does not necessarily make the argument 
presented in this Article superfluous.  There may be cases in which 
there will be no deadweight loss, because a firm with substantial profits 
will not incur the full loss of an exploration but will only lose the 
fraction of post-tax profits they receive from the gross profits.  Yet there 
are still many other cases in which a firm does not have any profits it 
could use for deducting its future losses.  Such a scenario is likely to 
happen when there is a sudden drop in energy prices.  This objection 
may limit the scope of the argument in the paper, but does not 
undermine it. 
Even if in reality there might be many firms without profits from 
other sources, meaning that their decisions will be distorted by taxes, 
there is a theoretical challenge facing the application of real option 
value to such cases.  If a refundable negative tax were provided to such 
firms, their decision whether or not to invest also would not have been 
distorted by taxes.  Under such a regime, there would not be any case 
in which a decision of the firm over whether to invest would be 
distorted by taxes, and thus there would not be any case in which there 
is a deadweight loss as a result of taxation of natural resources.  Such a 
>≤
>≤ 
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regime, with strong support on the theoretical level, would make the 
argument presented in this Article futile: there would not be any 
deadweight loss from taxation of natural resources or any need to 
reassess it by taking into account option value. 
I admit that such a regime has a strong justification in theory, but 
in practice it does not exist in almost any country, including the U.S.126  
Scholars have provided different explanations for why such a regime 
does not exist, from political economy explanations to administrative 
explanations.127  What matters is that at the end of the day the 
deadweight effect of taxes on natural resources is still with us and is 
here to stay, so at least it should be assessed properly. 
C.   Missing the Technological Development Target 
The conclusion of this Article is premised on assessments 
regarding technological developments in exploration, development, 
and production in the gas and oil sectors.  Although these assessments 
are the best available in the industry, they are still assessments, and 
their projections may turn out to be erroneous.  If the policy suggested 
by this Article is adopted, certain fields may still not be exploited 
because the actual cost reduction is not, in fact, large enough to offset 
the increased tax rate.  Furthermore, the price of the natural resources 
in question might decrease and reduce the profitability of producing 
those natural resources even if the expected technological 
development materializes.  Assuming that under such circumstances 
the option value has diminished significantly, the increased tax rate 
would generate a significant deadweight loss.  Although the question 
of error costs is relevant to any policy, the question is especially relevant 
to a policy such as the one suggested in this Article.  Policies that 
mainly rely on speculation regarding future trends have an especially 
 
 126  In the U.S., § 172 of the I.R.C. permits taxpayers to carry losses back three years 
and carry losses forward fifteen years, but in order for the losses to be of any use to the 
taxpayer they have to be accompanied by gains.  The tax court suggested in Alprosa 
Watch Corp. v. Commissioner that the U.S. should permit a refundable credit for losses 
even without incurring gains in any time frame.  11 T.C. 240 (1948).  For an argument 
for accepting such a mechanism, see Mark Campisano & Roberta Romano, Recouping 
Losses: The Case for Full Loss Offsets, 76 NW. L. REV. 709, 709–10 (1982). 
 127  Regarding the administrative cost of burdening the treasury to pay out refunds 
to businesses, see Campisano & Romano, supra note 126, at 741.  Campisano and 
Romano claim that that is one of the central justifications for preferring free 
transferability of losses (enabling firms with losses to sell their losses to firms with 
gains) over a refundable credit.  Regarding political economy explanations for the 
current system that does not permit a refundable credit for losses, see Mark Campisano 
& Roberta Romano, On the Benefits of Loss Recoupment: A Response, 21 TAX NOTES 209, 
211 (1983) (arguing that practitioners have a strong interest in maintaining the 
current complex system of loss carry back and carry forward). 
LIBSON (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:26 PM 
874 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:833 
high chance of erring. 
On the face of it there seems to be a simple solution: it is always 
possible to decrease the tax rate and mitigate the costs if predictions 
turn out to be incorrect.  It is important to understand, however, the 
significant costs that accompany such reductions of the tax rate.  In his 
book on the subject, Professor Daniel Shaviro emphasizes the 
substantial costs that are involved with legal transitions in general, and 
transitions in the tax system in particular.  The instability generated by 
changes in the tax system is a substantial cost of such changes.128  Adam 
Smith has expressed this view through the maxim that the only good 
tax is an old tax.129  A transition to reduce a tax might be even worse 
than a transition to impose or increase a tax.  From an efficiency 
perspective, a transition in which a tax is imposed retroactively may 
enhance efficiency—it enables the government to collect taxes without 
the price of deadweight loss, and it does not distort the individual’s 
decision making because it applies to a decision he has made in the 
past.130  The reverse is true for a transition in which the tax rate is 
decreased: society incurred the cost of the deadweight loss without 
reaping the benefit of collecting taxes.  Firms have made decisions 
under the assumption that a high tax rate would apply and as a 
consequence reduced exploration and production, but eventually paid 
only a low-rate tax. 
This is the caveat to the policy suggested in this Article—dynamic 
analysis is complex and should involve the best possible application of 
empirical data.  There is always a significant chance that even the best-
informed predictions will turn out to be false.  Although it is always 
possible to mitigate such a mistake by decreasing the tax rate, the costs 
of such transitions are significant.  Thus, the treatment of changes in 
the tax rate based on projections should be analyzed cautiously before 
implemented, even though it seems that one could always roll back to 
the previous tax rate. 
 
 128  DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 2–3 (2000).  It should be noted that in his book 
Shaviro also highlights that in some cases the transition costs are inflated: he 
distinguishes the transition risk effect which should not raise any efficiency concerns 
and the retroactive tax effect which should.  See id. at 5–7. 
 129  Id. at 3 (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 457 (1976 ed.)). 
 130  See Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence Kotlikoff, Investment Versus Savings Incentives: 
The Size of the Bang for the Buck and the Potential for Self-Financing Business Tax Cuts, in 
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT DEFICITS 121 (Laurence Meyer ed., 
1983); Shaviro, supra note 128. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
This Article opens with a quotation from Robert Frost’s poem, The 
Road not Taken: “And both that morning equally lay / In leaves no step had 
trodden black / Oh, I kept the first for another day!”131  These verses serve as 
a preamble to the central theme in the Article—that by imposing a 
high tax rate we might essentially be keeping an option for another 
day, and this option that is not taken into account may have 
considerable value.  But the next verses of the poem reveal a concern 
about leaving a path for another day: “Yet knowing how way leads on to 
way / I doubted if I should ever come back.”132  We may never, in fact, exploit 
the fields put off for the future—our predictions, no matter how 
carefully formulated, may turn out wrong. 
This Article aims at substantiating the claim that even if a high tax 
rate does not enable exploring and developing a field in the present, 
there is still a strong likelihood it will be developed in the future under 
the same tax rate.  The reason for this is the constant technological 
advancements in the gas and oil sectors that should reduce costs over 
time.  The central argument of this Article applies to taxation in 
general: the estimated deadweight loss of taxation may be lower than 
the conventional assessment due to the neglect of the option value that 
accompanies a tax.  Taking into account the neglected option value 
may imply that the optimal tax rate should be higher than the current 
rate.  The Article has focused on taxation of gas and oil since 
substantiating the option value in that sector is fairly easy; yet in 
principle, this argument could be relevant to other taxes in which 
there is a substantial option value that is generated by postponing 
present economic activity.  This argument has significant fiscal 
implications for tax policy: the volume of oil and gas taxes in the U.S. 
should be much larger. 
Even if this forecast is erroneous, and the technological 
advancements would not be sufficient for exploring new gas and oil 
resources under the higher tax rate, it is always possible to “roll back” 
to the prior development path by decreasing the tax rate.  This is one 
of the major sources of the real option value—it leaves different 
courses of action open, so even if the prospects one has based his 
actions on have not materialized, one can hedge such a loss by going 
back and taking the other path that has been left open.  Even though 
changing the tax rate may be accompanied by substantial costs, it still 
enables us to hedge the decision appropriately. 
 
 131  ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, in MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 9 (1916).  
 132  Id.  
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The argument made in this Article is based on a wider claim, 
gaining traction in legal scholarship, that economic models of law may 
overlook significant dynamic elements that may have a substantial 
impact on the analysis.  Integrating these dynamic elements may 
enable us to capture the effects of policy choices over time.  Dynamic 
models are inevitably more complex, but without taking into account 
this complexity the conclusions of the economic analysis are likely to 
be erroneous.  To paraphrase Carveth Read, it is better to be roughly 
right than precisely wrong.133 
 
 
 133  See supra note 120. 
